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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\\lEBER BASIN WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LOIS A. HISLOP, et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9317 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As part of its over-all water development program, the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District determined it neces-
sary that the Pineview Reservoir should be enlarged so as to 
accommodate additional storage water. In the course of the 
enlargement, it became necessary for it to condemn certain 
lands in the Ogden Valley area. These lands included certain 
lands owned by the defendant, Lois A. Hislop. She duly an-
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swered the complaint in the matter, setting forth her damages 
for certain lands taken from her and, by way of a counterclaim, 
affirmatively alleged that a certain real property business estab-
lishment, known as ((Jack's Shack," which was located on the 
main arterial highway between Ogden and Huntsville, had 
suffered a diminution in value because the enlargement of the 
reservoir necessitated the re-routing of traffic through and 
passed the Town of Huntsville in lieu of the route which 
the traffic formerly traveled in passing her business establish-
ment. 
Mrs. Hislop took the position that, although no part of 
the real property constituting her business establishment had 
actually been taken or direct! y touched by the condemnation 
proceedings or the enlargement of the reservoir, she nonethe-
less sustained a damage to her property which is peculiar to 
her and greater than the inconvenience suffered by the rest of 
the community in and around the Town of Huntsville, and 
which is just as direct and actual as the damage which she 
received when her farm and pasture lands were condemned 
tn formal proceedings. 
A sketch of the area involved, showing the former high-
way route and the re-location highway route, is set forth on 
Page 20 to assist the court in viewing the physical changes 
brought about by the enlargement of the reservoir as the changes 
affected this appellant. 
The parties to the action entered into a stipulation setting 
forth the facts as the same were involved in appellant's counter-
claim (R. 6), and each moved the court for summary judgment 
in its favor. The stipulated facts are as follows: 
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"1. That the issue of whether or not defendant is 
entitled to compensation for damages to her property 
caused by the re-location of Highway No. 39 into the 
Town of Huntsville, Utah, be submitted to the court 
for determination by summary judgment upon oral 
argument, written brief and the agreed facts as set out 
more particularly in Paragraph 2 of the stipulation. 
2. The defendant, prior to the enlargement of the 
Pineview Reservoir, operated a tavern which was 
situated adjacent to the main highway which enters 
the Town of Huntsville at a point on said highway 
approximately one block north of where the highway 
enters the incorporated city limits, as is indicated by 
an "X" mark in red pencil on the map attached hereto, 
and by reference made a part of this stipulation. The 
original road is indicated on said map by a brown 
pencil line and the new location of the road by a red 
pencil line. Access to the highway from defendant's 
property was unrestricted and convenient, the property 
being situated adjacent to the highway with no obstruc-
tions. The flow of traffic over the highway was a factor 
in the successful operation of defendant's business, as 
said highway was the route traveled by persons desiring 
to communicate between Ogden and the Town of 
Huntsville, or residential or recreational areas adjacent 
to the Town of Huntsville. 
The enlargement of the Pineview Reservoir by 
plaintiff necessitated the flooding of the roadbed lead-
ing into the Town of Huntsville at its present level 
and, at the request of the plaintiff and pursuant to an 
agreement between the plaintiff and the State of Utah, 
the road was re-located so as to by-pass most of the 
residential and commercial portions of the Town of 
Huntsville. The new road joins the original highway 
at a point approximately one mile east of defendant's 
business establishment. The location of the new high-
way adds a distance of approximately two and one-half 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
miles to the distance traveled between defendant's 
property and the City of Ogden, and the traffic moving 
from the Ogden vicinity to the Huntsville area and to 
the recreation areas adjacent to the Town of Hunts-
ville is diverted away from the defendant's place of 
business. 
3. That the issue of the amount of compensation, if 
any, to be awarded defendant be deferred until the 
defendant's right to such compensation is established." 
From a ruling of the lower court granting respondent 
summary judgment on the counterclaim, appellant takes this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. A RE-ROUTING OF HIGHWAY TRAFFIC OC-
CASIONED SOLELY BY REASON OF THE ENLARGE-
MENT OF A RESERVOIR WHICH SUBMERGES AN 
EXISTING HIGHWAY IS NOT TRAFFIC REGULATION 
UNDER THE POLICE POWER. 
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO RE-
COVER DAMAGES TO PROPERTY NOT DIRECTLY 
TAKEN IN EMINENT DOMAIN SITUATIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A RE-ROUTING OF HIGHWAY TRAFFIC OCCA-
SIONED SOLELY BY REASON OF THE ENLARGE-
MENT OF A RESERVOIR WHICH SUBMERGES AN 
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EXISTING HIGHWAY IS NOT TRAFFIC REGULA-
TION UNDER THE POLICE POWER. 
Appellant maintained a very profitable beer establishment 
on Highway 39 running between Ogden and Huntsville. The 
establishment was located at the junction of several highways, 
and its success was due to the volume of traffic which passed 
by its door. As a result of re-locating the highway so that it 
by-passed the establishment and the greater part of the Town 
of Huntsville, only limited amounts of traffic find it convenient 
to take the present route which must be followed in order to 
reach appellant's establishment. Obviously, such a condition 
has seriously affected the volume of business and, likewise, 
has greatly reduced the value of the properties owned by 
Mrs. Hislop. 
It is a well-established principle of law that access rights 
to and from a highway are a valuable property right: 
((The overwhelming weight of authority recognizes, 
as a statement of general principle, that the right of 
access to and from a public highway is one of the 
incidents of ownership or occupancy of land abutting 
thereon, of which the owner cannot be deprived with-
out compensation, whether the fee to the way is in 
the public or the abutter." 73 A.L.R. 2d 691. 
This principle has been uniformly recognized irrespective 
of whether access has been wholly cut off or whether the access 
has been partially removed. However, it is also generally rec-
ognized, and many cases support the proposition, that a state 
in the exercise of the police power in regulating traffic for the 
benefit of its citizens may re-route traffic even though, in so 
doing, it diverts traffic completely beyond a business establish-
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ment of this type. If such were the instant situation, appellant 
would not have appealed this decision. 
This case is clearly distinguishable from cases dealing 
with the right of a state to change the location of a highway 
because the road in question was not re-located as a result of 
a state policy or decision to suit the convenience of the traveling 
public. Instead, it was moved as a direct result of the enlarge-
ment of the Pineview Reservoir and at the specific request of the 
plaintiff and the United States Bureau of Reclamation, which 
acted as the agent for the plaintiff in the construction of the 
enlarged reservoir. This is made amply clear by the language 
of the contract entered into between the United States Bureau 
of Reclamation and the State Road Commission of Utah on 
June 30, 1955, which provides, in part, as follows: 
cc2. WHEREAS, the United States intends to enlarge 
Pineview Dam and Reservoir on the Ogden River in 
Ogden Canyon as a part of the Weber Basin Project 
which will necessitate the relocation and reconstruction 
of portions of State Highways 39 and 162 and certain 
portions of County Roads between the towns of Eden 
and Huntsville, Utah, and 
cc3. WHEREAS, the Highway Department will re-
locate and reconstruct those portions of State Highways 
39 and 162 and the County roads affected by the en-
largement of Pineview Reservoir, prot,ided that the 
cost thereof is assumed by the United States as a part 
of the Weber Basin Project." 
Further, respondent's own complaint in these proceedings 
states: 
CCIII. The enlarged Pineview Dam and Reservoir and 
appurtenances are part of the Weber Basin Project and 
will be constructed in Weber County, Utah. The con-
S 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
struction of the said enlarged Pineview Dam and 
Reservoir and appurtenances will necessitate the relo-
cation of certain highways and roads and will require 
the taking of additional lands." (Italics added). 
From the foregoing admissions, it is quite clear that the 
highway \Vas not re-located to suit the conveniences of the 
State of Utah or any other governmental agency having police 
power to regulate traffic. On the contrary, the situation is a 
mere disguised proceeding under the right of eminent domain 
without any intention on respondent's part to pay compensating 
damages. 
The situation is aptly stated in the recent case of Acker-
nzan vs. Port of Seattle, cited in 329 P. 2d 210 ( 1958) and 348 
P. 2d 644 ( 1960), where the problem involved the flight of 
low-flying aircraft from an airport over the properties owned 
by ad joining owners. The land owners contended that the use 
of the airspace over their properties, even though there was 
no actual physical trespass upon the land itself, constituted a 
taking for which the Port of Seattle should pay damages. 
In deciding that the damage was compensable and that it was 
not a mere exercise of the police power, the Supreme Court 
of the State of Washington made the following cogent ob-
servations: 
«« . the courts constantly emphasize the concepts 
of ( 1) 'cregulation" under the police power, and ( 2) 
««constitutional taking or damaging" under the eminent 
domain power. When restrictions upon the ownership 
of private property fall into the category of ««proper 
exercise of the police power," they, validly, may be 
imposed without payment of compensation. The dif-
ficulty arises in deciding whether a restriction is an 
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exercise of the police power or an exercise of the 
eminent domain power ... but, when private property 
rights are taken from the individual and are conferred 
upon the public for public use, eminent domain prin-
ciples are applicable." 
For the purpose of illustrating that one governmental 
unit cannot absolve itself from liability to pay damages in 
eminent domain by reason of contracting for its own purposes 
with another governmental agency, which latter agency in the 
exercise of its police power might be exempt from liability, the 
following quotation from California vs. Chevalier, et al. (331 
P. 2d 23 7 at P. 244-245) is quite apt: 
((As to the sufficiency of the pleadings, our attention 
has been directed to the Freeway Agreement between 
the state and city for the acquisition of defendants' 
property (Exhibit 9), the statutory provisions in the 
State and Highway Code for cooperation between city 
and state in relocating, closing and opening city streets 
in state highway construction, and judicial recognition 
of joint action in carrying out certain policies of the 
state. Watson vs. Greely, 67 Cal. App. 328, 227 P. 
664. Cooperation between city and state no matter 
how well recognized and arpproved would not justify 
a fraudulent declaration of an alleged public need and 
purpose that did not exist, or an act in eminent domain 
that was not bona fide.'' ' 
In commenting upon the protection granted to private 
property under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
together with the mandate upon the states made in the Four-
teenth Amendment, the court inserted a quotation of Mr. 
Justice Holmes: 
((When this seemingly absolute protection is found 
to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency 
10 
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of human nature is to extend the qualification more and 
more until at last private property disappears .... We 
are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire 
to improve the public condition is not enough to war-
rant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change." 
Quoting from a Texas case, in the same decision: 
C(Property in a thing consists not merely in its own-
ership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of 
use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys 
any of these elements of property, to that extent de-
stroys the property itself. The substantial value of 
property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, 
the value of the property is annihilated and ownership 
is rendered a barren right." 
This court should not permit respondent to claim immunity 
from liability in the instant situation merely by citing cases in-
val ving the proper exercise of highway re-routing under the 
police power. The situation here involved is quite different, 
and it is submitted that to permit respondent to cause the dam-
age here incurred without paying compensation will open the 
door to every conceivable situation whereby agencies having 
the power of eminent domain will damage or destroy valuable 
property rights at will without giving any regard to the effect 
caused upon valuable property rights created by the citizens 
of this state created through hard work and toil. 
II. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO 
] 1 
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RECOVER DAMAGES TO PROPERTY NOT DIRECTLY 
TAKEN IN EMINENT DOMAIN SITUATIONS. 
Although this court has recently proclaimed in several 
decisions that the sovereign immunity of the State of Utah 
holds it apart from suit and recovery for damages in instances 
of this and similar types of cases, holding that our statutory 
and constitutional provisions are not self -executing, it is rather 
fortunate that the respondent in this case can be reached through 
a direct suit. In fact, this writer is seriously concerned about 
the effect of the sovereign immunity doctrine extended to the 
State of Utah in situations involving taking or damaging of 
private property. The common law, which has so jealously 
guarded real property rights, has sustained a great loss to its 
effectiveness under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as ap-
plied to situations of this type, particularly in view of the highly 
accelerated program of construction of reservoirs, highways 
and similar public works in recent years. 
Appellant submits that this case is governed by the consti-
tution and the statutes of the State of Utah, which provide: 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Sec. 22: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." (Italics 
added). 
Section 78-34-10(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
nlf the property, though no part thereof is taken, 
will be damaged by the construction of the proposed 
improvement, the amount of such damages." 
The foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions 
clearly recognize that damages must be ascertained and assessed 
in the event private property is damaged, even though the 
12 
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<.:onstruction requires the taking of no part of the actual prop-
erty. This appeal squarely brings the court face to face with a 
factual situation which falls outside the police power regula-
tions and also involves a defendant which cannot claim the 
benefit of sovereign immunity. As such, it is submitted that the 
court's decision in this case may well establish a significant 
landmark in Utah jurisprudence setting forth the course of 
either traveling the road of state socialism or the recognition 
of private property rights. 
In the foregoing Washington case of Ackerman vs. Port 
of Seattle, commenting upon a provision of the Illinois consti-
tution similar to our constitutional provision and the statute 
of the State of Washington, the following statement was made: 
(!under this constitutional provision, a recovery may 
be had in all cases where private property has sustained 
a substantial damage by the making and using an 
improvetnent that is public in its character; that it does 
not require that the damage shall be caused by a tres-
pass, or an actual physical invasion of the owner's 
real estate, but, if the construction and operation of 
the . . . improvement is the cause of the damage, 
though consequential, the party may recover." 
The principle upon which damage to property similar to 
the damage in the instant case is predicated is that of inter-
ference with ingress and egress to one's property and its ease-
ment rights in the highway. These rights are numerous, and are 
subject only to the pre-emptive right of the state or municipality 
in the valid exercise of its police power. Even then, in some 
situations, eminent domain proceedings must be resorted to. 
Dooly Block vs. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 
229; 33 Pac. 229. 
13 
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A footnote case in 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, Sec. 
225, Page 859, contains the following statement: 
rrA village and a railroad company which, in order 
to abolish a grade crossing, construct a subway, vacating 
the surface crossing, thereby diverting travel from the 
space between the crossing and the entrance to the 
subway and depreciating the value of the abutting 
business property, are liable for the injuries thereby 
caused the owner." Schimmelman vs. Lake Shore and 
M.S.R. Co., 83 Ohio St. 356, 94 N.E. 840. 
In analyzing the cases carefully, there appears to be a 
rather sharp distinction between the results of the decisions 
where suit was commenced against a defendant who was some-
one having eminent domain power other than a state or mun-
icipality-such as the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. 
The police power of local and state governmental units, with 
power to alter road systems for the public good, is almost 
always present in most cases. But in situations where the mun-
icipality or the state furnished merely a means of procedure, 
and where the prime movant was some agency with a special 
benefit to be gained for itself or its stockholders or members, 
such as the Schimmelmann case, a marked departure is found 
in the cases. 
Such a situation is the one before this court, where the 
plaintiff in fact-rather than the State of Utah-was respon-
sible for moving the road and for defendant's resulting dam-
ages. 
Holdings similar to the Schimmelmann case, involving 
suits which were brought directly against the responsible party, 
are found in the following cases from Colorado and Nebraska. 
14 
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The facts are so nearly analogous that the cases have been 
briefed for the court's benefit. 
1\laJon City and Ft. D. R. Co. vs. Kennedy (Ne-
braska), 113 C.C.A. 412, 192 Fed. 538: 
Catherine Kennedy recovered a judgment against 
the railroad company for damages to her real property 
in Omaha, Nebraska, caused by the vacation and clos-
ing of parts of some streets and alleys. As the parts 
closed were several hundred feet distant from her 
property, her means of ingress and egress were merely 
impaired, not destroyed. The railroad company com-
plained that the trial court refused to hold and to charge 
the jury that there could be no recovery for a damage 
not differing in kind from that sustained by the general 
public. 
The Eighth Circuit Court in affirming the judgment 
applied the Nebraska constitutional provision on emi-
nent domain (which is the same as Utah's covering 
both ntaking" and ndamaging") as construed by the 
state court and held that: 
n ... the property owner may recover for all special 
damages in excess of that to the community at large, 
that such damage may arise from a closing of public 
highways not contiguous to but distant from his prop-
erty, and that the measure thereof is the difference 
between the values before and after the act com-
plained of.'' 
Denver Union Terminal Ry Co. vs. Glodt (Colo-
rado), 67 Colo. 115, 186 P. 904. 
Action to recover damages for the depreciation of 
the rental value and market value of Glodt' s property 
caused by the closing and vacation of parts of certain 
streets and the building of a viaduct approach. The 
Glodt property did not abut the parts closed. 
15 
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Headnote: 
''Where the closing of a street west of the square 
in which plaintiff's lots were located cut off all access 
from plaintiff's property to streets leading to the busi-
ness section of the town in the direction plaintiffs had 
been accustomed to use, which was the most convenient 
way of reaching such business section, and the closing 
of other streets resulted in leaving only an inadequate 
and dangerous way for egress on a street occupied by 
a viaduct, plaintiffs sustained such special damages as 
entitled them to compensation from defendant terminal 
company, for the closing of such streets." 
Although there has never been a reservoir case involving 
a factual situation where suit was brought against an agency 
other than the state or a municipality involving a re-routing 
of a highway, it has been recognized in the cases of Webber 
vs. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503, and State Road 
Commission vs. Fourth District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 
502, that the change in grade of an adjoining highway or the 
building of a viaduct in an ad joining street both constituted 
such interference with ingress and egress rights of the adjoining 
properties to the highway as to give rise to a claim for compen-
sable damages. 
Considering that the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District is enlarging the Pineview Reservoir so as to provide a 
benefit for the public-at-large in the form of storage and dis-
tribution of waters for irrigation and culinary usage, and that 
the re-routing of the highway was necessitated by reason of 
the benefit conferred upon the public-at-large, it is submitted 
that there is absolutely no practical or legal difference between 
the taking of portions of appellant's lands for flooding and 
16 
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the reduction in value of her other properties which were not 
taken-but which were seriously damaged by reason of the 
re-location of the highway as a part of the project. In one 
instance the lands themselves were trespassed upon by the 
stored waters and in the other instance the highway leading to 
her business establishment was inundated, thereby inflicting 
the loss complained of. Any legal approach to the situation 
which would permit recovery in one instance where an actual 
physical trespass occurred, but which would deny recovery in 
the other instance where the physical trespass was not direct! y 
on the property itself-but nevertheless a severance of the 
property from the highway traffic and which resulted in a 
much less accessible approach to the traveled highway-would 
seem illogical and entirely inconsistent with the demands of 
modern society and the need for the law to adapt itself to 
changing conditions. Were this result caused by a necessary 
public highway program, we could claim no damage, but the 
highway was moved solely to accommodate plaintiff's reservoir 
enlargement purposes. 
In the very recent Utah case of Southern Pacific Company 
rs. Arthur, et al., handed down on May 25, 1960, cited in 
3 52 P. 2d 69 3, ------------Utah 2d ____________ , Justice Wade, speaking 
for the court, recognized an identical right to that urged by 
the appellant in this case. There the Southern Pacific Company 
destroyed forage and natural access to stream or spring waters 
on one side of a mountain in western Box Elder County, making 
it dangerous for sheep and lambs to cross a valley. The court 
held that even though there had been no actual taking of lands 
by the railroad which acquired certain sand and gravel deposits 
in the valley by condemnation, the range owners were entitled 
17 
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to compensation for diminution of value of their land by injury 
done by the Southern Pacific Company to the natural crossing 
and lambing grounds. 
The court quoted with approval the same reasoning cited 
by appellant in this case: 
((Sec. 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953, providing the manner 
in which damages must be assessed in condemnation 
proceedings, reads: 
c CThe court, jury or referee must hear such legal 
evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to 
the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and 
assess. 
, , 
cc ( 3) If the property though no part thereof is taken, 
will be damaged by t~e construction of the proposed 
improvement, the amount of such damages. 
c c ( 5) As far as practicable compensation must be 
assessed for each source of damages separately." 
CCThe only crossing available to the sheep from the 
east side to the west side of respondents' land and vice 
versa was through Little Valley, which extends from 
the west lake shore due east to the head of Maple 
Canyon.'' 
c c • • • sheep can no longer cross Little Valley back 
and forth naturally while in search of food and water. 
The condition in which it is left is also very dangerous 
to the lives of sheep and lambs which when frightened 
are likely to plunge over the rim of the lands they have 
been grazing and get killed. Besides the danger to lives, 
which the pits have created, they have destroyed forage 
and natural access to stream or spring water on the west 
side of Promontory Mountain in the late winter or 
spring when the snow has melted on the east side of 
the mountain and it is dry. 
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The evidence revealed: 
" ... that the damages were of a special kind to the 
grazing use to which the range lands owned by respon-
dents were fitted and therefore even though there had 
been no actual taking of any lands they were entitled 
to just compensation under the provisions of paragraph 
3 above, for diminution of value of their lands by the 
substantial injury done to the only available natural 
crossing and lambing grounds.'' 
The foregoing pronouncement on the effect of Section 
78-3-1-10, coupled with the mandate of our constitutional pro-
vision, was correctly applied in the Southern Pacific Company 
vs. Arthur case. It is equally applicable to the case at bar, if 
not more so. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the lower court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of respondent under the facts of 
this case. Rather, the summary judgment granted should be 
vacated and set aside and summary judgment should be granted 
in favor of appellant and the case remanded to the lower court 
for proceedings calculated to determine the amount of dam-
ages sustained to appellant's properties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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